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HOW EMPLOYERS CAN RECONCILE THE
TENSION BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT'S
HOLDING IN EEOC V ABERCROMBIE & FITCH
STORES, INC. AND THE EEOC'S GUIDELINES
RELATING TO PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES
In 1972, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") was
amended to include the definition of religion.' This new addition required
employers to "reasonably accommodate" employees' religious observances
or practices, unless the accommodation was an undue hardship to the
employer's business.2 The duty to accommodate begins at the application
process and continues throughout the employment relationship. 3
Although an employer cannot take into account an applicant's or
employee's religion or religious beliefs when making employment
decisions, an employer "has an affirmative obligation to take into account
an individual's religion by providing 'reasonable accommodation' of
applicants' and employees' religious tenants or precepts." 4 Despite this
obligation, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") has made clear that "[q]uestions about an applicant's affiliations

or beliefs.., are generally viewed as non job-related and problematic
1 See 3-76 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 76.10 (2017)

(discussing development of religious accommodation); Symposium: Religion in the Workplace:
Proceedingsof The 2000 Annual Meeting of The Association of America Las Schools Section on
Law and Religion, 4 EMp. RTS.& EMP. POL'Y J. 87, 90 (2000) (discussing 1972 amendment and
religious accommodation); see also J. Gregory Grisham, Religion at Work: Balancing the Rights
of Employees and Employers, 42 TENN. B.J. 14, 15 (2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)(2016))
("Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) defines religion to include 'all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief."').
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2016); 3-76 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 76.10(1)
(LexisNexis 2017) (discussing how definition of religion in Title VII incorporates duty to
accommodate); see also ProhibitedEmployment PolicieslPractices,U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016)
(discussing prohibited employment practices). "The law requires an employer to reasonably
accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause difficulty
or expense to the employer. This means an employer may have to make reasonable adjustments
at work that will allow the employee to practice his or her religion ....
"Id.
3 See Grisham, supra note 1, at 18 (discussing employer's duty to accommodate).
"Reasonable religious accommodations include, but are not limited to, time and/or a place to
pray, leave for religious observances, job reassignments, and the ability to wear religious attire."
Id. at 19.
4 See SHAWE ROSENTHAL, EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK, § 18.01(4.0a) (2016) (providing
general overview of reasonable accommodation requirement).
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under federal law," and thus should not be asked.5 Section 2000e-2 of Title
VII explicitly states that it is unlawful for an employer
[T]o fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national ongin. ,6
Thus, employers can only ask questions to determine if the
applicant or employee is qualified for7 the job and not whether he or she
may need a religious accommodation.
Although Title VII requires that employers provide religious
accommodations to its applicants and employees, the law is silent as to
whether applicants and employees are required to give notice to their
employers that they require a religious accommodation. Several circuit
courts have interpreted Title VII to have a knowledge requirement. 8 These
circuit courts have held an employer must have knowledge of the need for
an accommodation for the employee or applicant to make its prima facie
9
case.

The Supreme Court, however, recently held in EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 1o that an employee need not show that
the employer had knowledge of the employee's religious accommodation
in order to prove his or her primafacie case and, in doing so, it overturned
5 Pre-Employment Inquires and Religious Affiliation or Beliefs, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries religious.cfm (last

visited Feb. 21, 2016) ("[E]mployers should avoid questions about an applicant's religious
affiliation, such as place of worship, days or worship, and religious holidays and should not ask
for references from religious leaders, e.g., minister, rabbi, priest, imam, or pastors."); see also
Prohibited Employment PolicieslPractices, supra note 2 (stating illegal for employer to
discriminate against applicant, job assignment, or promotions based on religion).
6 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2016) (providing
law relating to unlawful employment practices).
7 See Prohibited Employment PolicieasPractices,supra note 2 (discussing generally preemployment inquiries).
8 See Woodmanv. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 81-83 (2d Cir. 2005) (identifying circuits
requiring employees show their employer had knowledge accommodation to meet prima facie
case).
9 See Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Protos v.
Volkswagen, Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Lubeetsky v. Applied Card Sys.
Inc., 296 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding no religious discrimination where employer
rescinded applicant's offer because no knowledge of applicant's religion); see generally
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION: PLEADING AND PRACTICE

§ 2.05(5) (LexisNexis, 2016) ("[A]n

employee may forego his or her rights to accommodations if he fails to inform the employer of
his needs or refuses to cooperate with the employer in trying to reach an accommodation.").
10 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
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the circuit courts' holding that Title VII has a knowledge requirement."
The Supreme Court also held that "[a]n employer may not make an
applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in
employment decision." 12
The Court's holding creates a lesser burden for persons bringing a
religious accommodation claim and also increases the burden on employers
to inquire into potential religious accommodation needs.' 3 In the past, the
employee was responsible for informing his or her employer of his or her
need for a religious accommodation; the employer now has the burden of
initiating the process of determining whether a prospective employee may
need an accommodation.14 Thus, the Abercrombie & Fitch Inc. decision
creates a tension between an employer's duty to accommodate and the
employer's inability to inquire as to an applicant's or employee's religious
affiliations or beliefs, leaving many questions unanswered. 5
How does one show an employer's motive when the employer does
not have confirmed knowledge? 16 What does the court mean by "or
otherwise?' 17
How does an employer avoid a potential religious
u See id. (finding employer must only have motive, rather than knowledge with respect to
religious discrimination).
12 See id. at 2030 (stating rule for disparate-treatment claims based on failure to
accommodate religious practice).
13 See Gregory J. Eck, Heads or Tails? New Guidancefrom the Supreme Court Nearly Flips
Religious Accommodation Law on Its Head, HR LEGALIST (June
9, 2015),
http://www.hrlegalist.com/2015/06/heads-or-tails-new-guidance-from-the-supreme-court-nearlyflips-religious-accommodations-law-on-its-head/ (discussing when employer must offer religious
accommodations to applicants).
14 See id. ("[T]he burden now rests with the employer to initiate the interactive process in
determining whether a religious practice can be reasonably accommodated.").
15 See Stephanie Wilson, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch: Do You Need
to Ask Applicants
Whether They Require Religious Accommodation?, REEDSMITH: EMPLOYMENT LAW WATCH
(June 11, 2015), https://www.employmentlawwatch.com/2015/06/articles/employment-us/eeoc-vabercrombie-fitch-do-you-need-to-ask-applicants-whether-they-require-religiousaccommodation/ (discussing when employer should ask questions about whether applicant or
employee will need religious accommodation); see also Larry S. Perlman Don 'tAsk, Don't Tell?
When It Comes to Religious Accommodation, the Supreme Court Offers Guidance (Well, Sort
Of..), FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT PERSPECTIVES, EEOC
DEVELOPMENTS (June 8, 2015), https://www.laboremploymentperspectives.com/2015/06/08/
dont-ask-dont-tell-when-it-comes-to-religious-accommodation-the -supreme -court-offersguidance-well-sort-of/. (identifying four questions unanswered by Abercrombie).
16 See Perlman supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17 See Barbara D'Aquila & Margaret Rudolph, Headwinds and headscarves Charting a
Prudent Course for Employers in the Wake of EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch, GLOBAL WORK
PLACE INSIDER (June 8, 2015), http://www.globalworkplaceinsider.com/2015/06/headwinds-andheadscarves-charting-a-prudent-c ourse-for-employers-in-the -wake -of-eeoc -v-abercrombie -fitchstores-inc/ ("Future litigation may center on what the words 'or otherwise' mean, especially as
litigants attempt to show the real motive of an employer's decision when the employer did not
have 'actual' or 'confirmed' knowledge."); see also Judy Greenwald, Supreme Court's Religious
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discrimination lawsuit without asking his applicants and employees
whether or not they may need an accommodation? ' 8 This note will discuss
how this tension was created and how employers may resolve these
questions and avoid litigation.' 9
I. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION - STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
AND PRIMA FACIE CASE
In 1972, Title VII was amended to include the definition of religion
thereby making it illegal for an employer to "treat an employee or applicant
unfavorably based on the individual's religious beliefs., 20 Under the
amended act, religion is defined to include "all aspects of religious
observance and practice as well as belief unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance of practice without undue
,,21
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.

Headscarf Ruling Increases Bias Risks, BUSINESS INSURANCE (June 7, 2015),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/00010101/NEWS06/306079977/Supreme-Courtsreligious-headscarf-ruling-increases-employers-bias-risks (discussing impacts of Abercrombie
decision on employers).
18 See Perlman, supra note 15 and accompany text.
19 See inra Parts VI-VII.
20 See JAMES ANELLI & MICHAEL GARDNER, LeClair Ryan, XPERTHR EMPLOYMENT LAW
MANUAL 2348 (2017) (discussing 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)). Specifically, the Civil Rights Act
makes it unlawful for an employer to:
(1) [Flail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(2)(2016) (emphasis added).
See also 3-76 LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 76.02(1) (2017) (discussing statutory definition of religion).
21 See 42 U.S.C.S § 2000e(j) (2017) (defining religion); see also 3-76 LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 76.10(1) (2017) (discussing history of reasonable accommodation);
Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace; Rights and Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/
qa religiousgarbgrooming.cfm?renderforprint-1 (last visited May 20, 2017). According to the
2008 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance Manual on Religions
Discrimination, religious practice includes "attending worship services, praying, wearing
religious guard or symbols, displaying religious objects, adhering to certain dietary rules,
proselytizing or other forms of religious expression, or refraining from certain activities." EEOC
Compliance Manual: Section 12 Religious Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, (July 22, 2008), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.pdf.
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The amendment imposes an affirmative duty on employers to
accommodate their employees' religious beliefs or practices so long as the
accommodation does not impose an undue hardship on the employer. 22
An individual can assert a religious discrimination claim under two
theories: (1) disparate treatment and (2) religious accommodation.2 3 In
order to make a primafacie religious accommodation claim, an employee
must establish that: "(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that
conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the
employer of this belief; and (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to
comply with the conflicting employment requirement. 24 Once the
employee has made her primafacie case, the burden shifts to the employer
to show that she or he could not accommodate the employee's religious
needs without undue hardship. 5
II.RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION AND EMPLOYER'S
KNOWLEDGE PRIOR TO ABERCROMBIE
Title VII does not explicitly require that an employer have
knowledge of an employee or applicant's religious belief or practice. 26 It
only requires that the employer knew that his employee was a member of a
religion and that the employer discriminated against his employee on the
basis of that religion.2 7 Prior to Abercrombie, many circuit courts held that
evidence of an employer's knowledge about an employee's or applicant's
protected status is necessary in order for an employee to establish his or her

22

See Shawn D. Twing and Andrew G. Little, Labor and Employment Law, 32 TEx. TECH L.

REv. 869, 886-87 (2000) (discussing accommodation of religious belief under Title VII).
23 See Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing
discrimination suit as involving two separate theories); Chalmers v. Tulon Co., 101 F.3d 1012,
1017 (4th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging courts have recognized employees may utilize two theories
in religious discrimination claims); Mann v. Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1368-70 (8th Cir. 1993)
(utilizing disparate treatment and religious accommodation to evaluate plaintiff's claim).
24 See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019 (citing Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. Of Educ., 757 F.2d 476,
481 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1984)); Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A PrincipledApproach to Title
VII andReligious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719, 743-44 (1996) (discussing elements of
primajfacie case and burden shift of religious discrimination claim).
25 See Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1019 (finding employer must show he or she could not
accommodate employee's accommodation without undue hardship).
26 See Davis v. Mothers Work, Inc., No. 04-3943, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15890, at *24-28
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2005) (finding employee made prima facie case because employees over
garments were religious).
27 See Beasley v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 940 F.2d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
plaintiff in a Title VII religious discrimination suit has the burden of showing that her religion
was the basis of her discharge.").
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primafacie case of religious discrimination under Title VII. 28 The circuit
courts determined that Title VII not only imposed a duty on the employer
to accommodate but also imposed a reciprocal duty on the employee to
provide notice to his or her employer that his or her religion may interfere
with the employer's employment practices. 29 For example, an employee
who vaguely referenced a need for an accommodation without specific
details did not make his prima facie case under this standard. 0
Furthermore, under this standard an employee's appearance did not
automatically create a duty to accommodate unless the employee explicitly
told the employer that she or he required an accommodation due to his or
her religious beliefs or practice.3 1 By providing notice of the employee's
religious beliefs or practices, an employer has afforded the opportunity to
accommodate the those religious beliefs or practices.
28

See Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing how

different circuits have dealt with knowledge requirement); see also Lubetsky v. Applied Card
Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2002) ("[W]here intentional religious discrimination
under Title VII is alleged, a prima facie case is established if the plaintiff demonstrates the
challenged employment decision was made by someone who was aware of the plaintiffs
religion."); Johnsonv. Angelica Uniform Group, Inc., 762 F.2d 671, 672 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding
district no religious discrimination by employer because employee failed to provide advance
notice); Beasley, 940 F.2d at 1088 ("To establish aprimajaciecase, a plaintiff must show that (1)
the practices are religious in nature; (2) the employee call the religious practices to the employer's
attention, and (3) the religious practices were the basis of the discharge."); Geraci v. Moody
Tottrup, Int'l, 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming non-visibly pregnant employee failed to
provide notice to employer for pregnancy discrimination suit). The court in Geraci held:
[I]n other cases involving personal attributes not obvious to the employer, courts have
regularly held that the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination
unless he or she proves that the employer knew about the plaintiff's particular personal
character. An employee's religion, for example, is often unknown to the employer, and
we have accordingly required employees to inform their employers of their religious
beliefs in order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination based on failure to
make reasonable accommodations.
Geraci, 82 F.3d at 581.
29 See Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing employee's
obligation to inform employer of need for accommodation).
30 See Johnson, 763 F.2d at 674 (discussing prima facie requirement for religious
discrimination case).
31 See Reed, 330 F.3d at 936 ("Even if he wears a religious symbol, such as a cross or a
yarmulka, this may not pinpoint his particular beliefs and observations; and anyway employers
are not charged with detailed knowledge of the beliefs and observances associated with particular
sects."); see also Jennifer Ann Drobac & Jill L. Wesley, Religion and Employment
Antidiscrimination Law: Past,Present, andPost Hosanna-Tabor,69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
761, 791 (2014) (noting courts do not expect employers to be experts in religion nor monitor
religious needs).
32 See Dorbac & Wesley, supra note 31, at 791 ("The notification must be specific enough so
that the employer has a general understanding of what the employee's religious beliefs are and
what accommodation of those beliefs might entail.").
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The EEOC's 2008 Compliance Manual ("Compliance Manual")
similarly asserted that employees had a duty to provide their employers
with notice of their need for an accommodation.33 The Compliance
Manual states that "[a]n applicant or employee who seeks religious
accommodation must make the employer aware both of the need for
accommodation and that it is being requested due to a conflict between
religion and work. 4 The employee, therefore, could not assume that the
employer knew that she needed a religious accommodation."
Although the Compliance Manual indicated that there was a notice
requirement, it also stated that there were no "magic words" required to put
an employer on notice of an applicant or employee's potential need for
religious accommodation.3 6 The employee was only required to "provide
enough information to make the employer aware that there exists a conflict
between the individual's religious practice or belief and a requirement for
applying for or performing the job."37 The Compliance Manual, therefore,
suggested that the notice requirement was met so long as the employer had
enough information to determine that there could be a problem.38 The
Compliance Manual cites Brown v. Polk Country39 as an example. In
Brown, the court found that an employer, despite never being told that his
employee required an accommodation, was provided enough information to
make him aware that his employee needed a religious accommodation
33 See EEOC ComplianceManual, supra note 21.
34 See id. at 47 (emphasis added) (explaining

requirements of requesting religious
accommodations); see also Religious Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) ("When
an employee or applicant needs a dress or grooming accommodation for religious reasons, he
should notify the employer that he needs such an accommodation for religious reasons.").
35 See EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 21, at 47 ("The employee is obligated to
explain the religious nature of the belief or practice at issue, and cannot assume that the employer
will already know or understand it.").
36 See id.; EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013)
("To request an accommodation, an individual may use plain language and need not mention any
particular terms such as 'Title VII' or 'religious accommodation."').
37 EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 21, at 47. See also Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8
F.3d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding employee's request to participate in religious conversion
ceremony sufficient to put employer on notice). "A sensible approach would require only enough
infornation about an employee's religious needs to permit the employer to understand the
existence of a conflict between the employee's religious practices and the employer's job
requirements." Id. (citations omitted).
38 See Walter Olsen, A Hijab and a Hunch: Abercrombie and the Limits of Religious
Accommodation, 2014-15 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 139, 145 (2014) ("Cases from the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Eighth, Ninth. and Eleventh Circuits could be read as holding that the notice
requirement was met once the employer had enough information to figure out a conflict, whether
or not the employee had stated it in so many words.").
39 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995) (suggesting notice is not as hard to meet as previously
believed).
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because the employee's previous reprimand was directly related to the
employee's religious activities. 4o
III. SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF KNOWLEDGE
REQUIREMENT
In EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc.,4 the Supreme Court
overruled the circuit courts, finding that Title VII has a knowledge
requirement, despite many other circuits having found knowledge
necessary to create a prima facie case in a religious discrimination. 42 In

this case, Samantha Elauf ("Elauf'), a practicing Muslim who wears a
headscarf, applied for a position at Abercrombie & Fitch Store, Inc.

("Abercrombie").

43

During Elauf s interview, the assistant manager found

Elauf qualified for the position but was worried that Elaufs headscarf
would violate the company's Look Policy, which prohibited its employees

from wearing "caps.

44

As a result, Elaufs interviewer asked the store

manager and the district manager if Elaufs headscarf violated the policy
and informed both managers that she believed Elauf wore the headscarf for

religious reasons.4 5 The district manager told Elaufs interviewer not
to
46

hire Elauf because her headscarf violated Abercrombie's Look Policy.
Prior to certiorari review, the Tenth Circuit granted summary
judgment in favor of Abercrombie because Elauf never informed

Abercrombie that she wore her headscarf for religious reasons and,
therefore, required an accommodation for her religious needs.4 7
40

The

See id. at 654 (rejecting argument that Title VII does not protect employees who have

never requested religious accommodations); Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359,
1363 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding notice where employer had knowledge of employee's refusal to
sell condoms at prior job). But see Wessling v. Kroger Co., 554 F. Supp. 548, 552 (E.D. Mich.
1982) (contesting employer notice). The court in Wessling found that the employer was not
placed on notice when his employee requested to leave early to set up for a church play because
the request "was not in terms of a request for an accommodation of her religious practices" and,
thus, did not provide the employer with enough information to indicate that there was a conflict
between his employee's religious practice and his job obligations. Id. at 552.
41 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
42 See id. at 2031 (addressing issue of whether employees must inform employers of
religious need).
43 See id. (setting up relationship between parties).
44 See id.; Wilson supra note 15 (providing background for case).
45 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2031 (stating interviewer's steps in
addressing her concerns with Elauf's headscarf).
46 See id. (stating district manager indicated all headwear, religious or otherwise, would
violate "Look Policy").
47 See E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1110-43 (10th Cir.
2013) (granting Abercrombie summary judgment). Even though the interviewer assumed Elauf
was Muslim because of her headscarf, the court found that the EEOC could not establish a prima
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Supreme Court overturned the Tenth Circuit's finding, holding that Title

VII does not 48impose a knowledge requirement, but rather imposes a motive

requirement.
Applying this rule, the Supreme Court found that an employer who
has actual knowledge of an individual's need for an accommodation does
not violate Title VII so long as his refusal to hire was not motivated by the
avoidance of the needed accommodation. 49 Furthermore, the Court also
found that an employer who has "no more than an unsubstantiated
suspicion" of a needed accommodation may violate Title VII if his motive
is to avoid the accommodation.50 Thus, an employer - who denies an
applicant employment when he believes, but does not know for certain that
the applicant is an orthodox Jew who requires Saturdays off - will violate
Title VII because the employer's desire to avoid the accommodation was a
motivating factor in his decision not to hire. 5' Although, the court did not
facie case because the interviewer did not have "particularized, actual knowledge" about Elauf's
religion. Id. at 1128; see also Andrew M. Campbell, What Constitutes Employer's Reasonable
Accommodation ofEmployee's Religious Preferences Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964,
134 A.L.R. FED. 1, 5 (1997) superseded in partby, Jay M. Zitter,
Employer's Dress Policy as Religious Discrimination Under FederalLaw, 12 A.L.R. FED. 3d 5

(2016) (discussing E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015));
Drobac & Wesley, supra note 31, at 792-93 (stating Court found Abercrombie did not have
notice of accommodation).
48 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2032-33 (finding applicant need not
inform employer of need for accommodation under Title VII). In reaching its holding, the Court
examined the language of Title VII's disparate treatment provision which prohibits employers
from "(1) 'fail[ing] ... to hire' an applicant' (2) 'because of' (3) 'such individual's ... religion'

(which includes his religious practice)." Id. at 2032 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat 701 (1964)). The Court stated that while the words "because of' typically
imports the traditional but-for causation, "Title VII relaxes this standard ... to prohibit even
making... a 'motivating factor' in an employment decision." Id. at 2032. Furthermore, the
Court discussed how some antidiscrimination statutes include a knowledge requirement. Id. For
example, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 "defines discrimination to include an
employer's failure to make 'reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations' of an applicant." Id. at 2032-33 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2008)). Section

2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII does not impose a similar requirement but rather "links the forbidden
consideration to each of the verbs preceding it; an individual's actual religious practice may not
be a motivating factor in failing to hire, in refusing to hire, and so on." Id. at 3032.
49 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2033 (discussing Court's intention
when saying intentional discrimination provision prohibits certain motives).
50 See id. (addressing how motive requirement affects Title VII violations). See also Neal
Mollen & Sean Smith, "Confirmed" Knowledge of Need for Religious Accommodation Not
Required Element in Title VII Case, Says Supreme Court, PAUL HASTINGS (June 3, 2015),

https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id-e575e469-23 34-6428-81 icffoo004cbded (reiterating employer rejecting applicant because suspects applicant needs
accommodation for religious practice violates Title VII).
51

See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2033-34. (discussing motive within

context of disparate treatment claims); Mollen & Smith, supra note 50 (explaining Courts
holding); ANELLI & GARDNER, supra note 20 ("[T]he court ruled that an employer that does not
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address how to determine motive, it stated "[a] request for accommodation,

or the employer's certainty that the practice exists, may make it easier to
infer motive, but is not a necessary condition of liability."52 The Supreme

Court also stated that "the rule for disparate-treatment claims based on a
failure to accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An
employer may not make an applicant's religious practice, confirmed or

otherwise, a factor in employment decisions.

53

IV. LITIGATION POST-ABERCROMBIE
Lower courts have begun to apply Abercrombie's motive standard.
For example, the Fifth Circuit recently held in Nobach v. Woodland Village
Nursing Center, Inc. 4 that a former employee did not meet her primafacie
case because she did not advise any of her supervisors that she required a
religious accommodation.55 In Nobach, a former employee, who worked
as a nursing home activities aid, brought a Title VII action against her
former employer alleging that she was discharged from her position
because she refused to pray the Rosary with a patient.56 Nobach asserted
that she refused to pray with the patient because it was against her
religion. 57 Nobach alleged that she told the nurse's assistant - an employee
of the nursing home whom did not act as a supervisor of the employee know that a job applicant requires an accommodation may still discriminate against the applicant
because the focus [is] on the employer['s] motivations."); 10-261 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW § 261.03 (LexisNexis, 2017) ("The Supreme Court held that if an employer refuses to hire
an individual based on its belief that she will require a religious accommodation such as a dress
code exemption, and she actually would need one if hired, Title VII is violated.").
52 Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2032-33 (explaining why Court disagrees
with Defendant's argument that actual knowledge is required under Title VII). The Court
explained that:
[W]hile a knowledge requirement cannot be added to the motive requirement, it is
arguable that the motive requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least
suspects that the practice in question is a religious practice i.e., that he cannot
discriminate 'because of' a 'religious practice' unless he knows or suspects it to be a
religious practice. That issue is not presented in this case, since Abercrombie knew
or at least suspected that the scarf was worn for religious reasons. The questions has
therefore not been discussed by either side .... It seems to us inappropriate to resolve
this unargued point by way of dictim ....
Id. at 2033 n.3.
53 Id. at 2033 (discussing Title VII's disparate-treatment provision).
54 799 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2015).
55 Id. at 379 (finding no evidence that employee advised her supervisors about religious
accommodation).
56 See id. at 376-77 (providing background sequence of events leading up to termination).
57 See id. at 376 (describing employee's refusal to pay).
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that she could not pray with the patient because it was against her
religion.5 8 After telling the assistant that she could not read or pray the
Rosary with the patient, the assistant remained silent.5 9 The patient was not
read the Rosary and filed a complaint with the nursing home activities
director who was also Nobach's head supervisor. 60 The activities director
met with the nursing home's director of operations, who advised the
director to write up the employee. 61 Following this meeting, Nobach was
written up for the fifth time and, as a consequence, was discharged for her
failure to assist the patient.62
The court found that the employee's evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that her employer knew or suspected that the employee's
religious beliefs required the employer to accommodate and exclude the
employee from praying the Rosary. 63 The court reasoned that the
employee did not advise anyone involved with her discharge that her
religion prevented her from reading patients the Rosary and that those
involved with her discharge did not suspect that she refused to read the
patient the Rosary because of her religious belief.64
See id. (delving into employee's decision).
Nobach v. Woodland Village Nursing Ctr., Inc., 799 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 2015)
(recalling what occurred when Nobach told assistant she could not read to patient). Specifically,
Nobach said: 'JI]f you would like to perform the Rosary, you're more than welcome to." Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
60 See id.
(detailing what followed right before Nobach discharge).
61 See id. (detailing same).
62 See id.
at 376-77. The court remarked that:
58

59 See

[W]hen Nobach asked the reason, [the activities director] said that Nobach had been
written up for the incident and was now fired for failing to assist a resident with the
Rosary ....[The activities director] told Nobach: "I don't care if it's your fifth writeup or not. I would have fired you for this instance alone."
Id.
63

See id.at 379 (noting employee did not meet showing of religious accommodation

evidence). The court noted that:
[Iff
[the employee] had presented any evidence that [the employer] knew, suspected, or
reasonably should have known the cause for his refusing this task was her conflicting
religious belief and that [the employer] was motivated by this knowledge or
suspicion the jury would certainly have been entitled to reject [the employer's]
explanation for [the employee's] termination.
Id.
64 See Nobach, 799 F.3d at 378-79 (citing EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015)). The court relies on the holding in Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc.,
stating that actual knowledge is not required but that "[a] request for accommodation, or the

employer's certainty that the practice exists, may make it easier to infer motive, but isnot a
necessary condition of liability." Id. at 379 (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., 135 S.Ct.

at 2033).
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In addition to circuit courts, district courts have also begun to apply
the motive standard. 65 The Eastern District of Texas recently held in
Mindrup v. Goodman Networks, Inc. 66 that an email between an employee
and a high ranking individual at the employer's company was sufficient to
show that the employer knew, or should have suspected, that the employee
required an accommodation. 67 In Mindrup, a former employee, who was
the company's Director of Communications and a Buddhist, brought an
action against his former employer under Title VII alleging he was fired
because he refused to add Bible quotes to the a daily email message that
was sent to all of the employees at the company. 68 The employer argued
that the employee did not meet its prima facie case because there was no
evidence it suspected that the employee was a Buddhist when the employee
refused to include Bible verses in the daily email. 69 The employee argued
that he informed the employer of his religious belief because he had
emailed the company's Corporate Secretary the day after he was asked to
add Bible quotes to a daily email message, and had explained that he was
unable to perform this act because of his religious beliefs. 70 The court
found that there was sufficient evidence to show that the employer knew, or
suspected that, the employee refused to perform his work duties due to his
religious beliefs because the employee had informed him of his religious
beliefs, and that there was a conflict between his religious practice and his
job requirements. 7'
Similarly, the District of Colorado recently held in EEOC v.
Jetstream Ground Services Inc. 72 that an employer knew or suspected the
employee needed an accommodation because the employee wore her

65

See Mindrup v. Goodman Networks, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-157-ALM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

139678, at *29-30 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2015) (noting plaintiff has burden of providing evidence
to infer motive).
66 No. 4:14-CV-157-ALM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139678, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2015).
67 Id. at *20-23 (discussing ways employee informed employer of his religious belief).
68 See id. at *5-6 (alleging termination because of refusal to add Bible quotes to email).
69 See id. at *6 (outlining arguments of both parties). It was the employer's position that its
decision to terminate the employee was not due to the employee's religious affiliation because the
employer had no knowledge of the employee's religious association. Id.
70 See id. at *20 (discussing email sent by employee to executive officer of company).
71 See Mindrup, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139678, at *19-20 (citing Heller v. EEB Auto Co., 8
F.3d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1993) & Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 1978)).
The court states that the employee's email to the executive office of the Company "specifically
advises that he is unable to add Bible quotes, as he does not wish to offend others or his own
personal religious belief, which is sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on this
point." Id. at 20.
72 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015).
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religious garb consistently during non-work hours. 73 In Jetstream Ground
Services Inc., five female Muslims cabin-cleaning employees, brought a
Title VII action against their former employer for failing to re-hire them
because their religious beliefs required them to wear hijabs and long-skirts
in public. 74 The employer had a uniform policy, which required cabin
cleaners to wear pants while working.75 One of the employees wore a
hijab and a skirt on her way to work and during breaks, but removed,
regularly, her hijab and skirt to change into pants in preparation for work
hours.76 However, she never requested to wear a skirt while at work. 77
The employer moved to dismiss the employee's religious
accommodation, and disparate treatment claims because it alleged that the
employee never informed or requested a religious accommodation since
she wore pants and did not wear a hijab during her shifts.7 The court
found that there was sufficient evidence to show that the employer knew or
suspected that the employee needed an accommodation and that her need
for an accommodation was a motivating factor in its decision to lay her
79
off
The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to create a
genuine dispute because the employee consistently wore her hijab and long
skirt in the workplace, as well as during non-work hours and breaks.8 0
Similarly, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held in
Mathis v. Christian Heating and Air Conditioning, Inc.S that an
employee's voiced objection to an employer's policy is sufficient evidence
to show that an employer knew or suspected that the employee needed an
accommodation. 2 In Mathis, an employee, who worked as an installation
" See id. at 1318-19 (finding sufficient evidence supporting whether employer knew, or at
least suspected, employee needed religious accommodation). The employee consistently wore
her religious garments not only to work, but also during non-work hours. Id.
14 See id.
at 1305-09 (providing background facts of case).
15 See id. at 1306 (stating employer's dress code required cabin cleaners wear pants while
working regardless of request to wear skirts).
76

See id.at 1311 (describing employee's attire before work, during work, and during non-

work hours).
77 See EEOC v. Jet Stream Ground Servs., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1301 (D. Colo. 2015)
(stating employee did not request accommodation to wear skirt or hijab during work).
78 See id. at 1317 (discussing why employer believes employee's claim should be dismissed).
The employer maintained that there was no evidence the person who laid-off the employee had
knowledge the employee was Muslim. Id.
79 See id. at 1319-20 (finding evidence that employer's management knew or suspected
employee desired accommodation and discharged for it).
80 See id. at 1319 (stating employee consistently wore religious garments in work place).
81 158 F. Supp. 3d 317 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
82 See id. at 331-32 (finding employees objection to ID badge sufficient to conclude
employee informed employer of religious belief). The court stated, "[a] reasonable trier of fact
could infer from this ... that [employee] terminated plaintiff's employment 'with the motive of
avoiding accommodation."' Id.at 332.
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mechanic, filed a Title VII action against his employer, a heating and air
conditioning company, for terminating his employment because he covered
the employer's religious mission statement on the back of his employee ID
badge. 83 The employer had a policy where all its employees were required
to wear an ID that had their name, photograph, and a portion of the
company's mission statement.8 4 The employee was an atheist and covered
the statement with tape on his badge because he did not agree with it and
did not believe that employees should have to wear a religious statement
that connects to someone else's religion.85
During a workday, the
employer asked the employee why his badge was covered with tape and the
employee responded that he did so because he did not agree with the
mission statement and objected to the employer pushing his religion on
him.8 6 The owner dictated that he would have to wear the badge uncovered
or he would need to unequivocally quit the company.8 7 The owner
subsequently took the employee's badge and terminate his employment.88
The court found that the employee had presented sufficient evidence that
the employer terminated the employee's employment with the motive of
avoiding an accommodation because the employee voiced his objection to
the mission statement and said that he did so because of his religious
beliefs.89 The court reasoned that the employee "need only show that [the
employer] acted upon an improper motive when it terminated his
employment and/or when it failed to accommodate him." 90

83
84

See id. at 321 (discussing employer's badge policy).
See id.at 322 (stating employee covered badge because he was atheist). The employee did

not tell anyone involved in management that he covered his badge for religious purposes nor did
anyone involved in management notice that the employee was covering the employer's mission
statement. Id. The employee did, however, tell other employees that he covered the mission
statement on his I.D. because he did not feel that employees should "have to wear a religious
statement because of somebody else's religion." Id. (citations omitted).
85 Id.(stating employer noticed tape on employee's badge and requested employee to remove
it).
86 See Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 317, 322 (E.D.
Pa. 2016) (describing employee response to employer's request to remove tape from I.D.).
87 See id.at 322-23 (articulating employer's demand to remove tape and when employee
disagreed, he was terminated).
88 See id.at 323 (arguing employee's noncompliance decidedly was him quitting).
89 See id at 332 ("A factfinder could.., take notice of the lack of evidence that [the

employer] attempted to have any constructive conversation with [the employee] about [the
employee's] disagreement with the mission statement to infer that [the employer] preferred to
avoid accommodating [the employee's] beliefs."). The court concluded there was sufficient
evidence for a jury to infer that the employee's termination was motivated by the employer's
desire to avoid the employee's religious accommodation. See id.
90 Id. at 331 (citing EEOC v.Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015)). The
court agreed with employee's contention that "Title VII, as interpreted inAbercrombie, does not
require [the employee] to prove that he advertised his atheistic beliefs to his employer, nor does it
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V. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES POST-ABERCROMBIE
Post-Abercrombie, it has been suggested that employers revise
their hiring procedures and document their hiring decisions. 91 Specifically,
commentators recommend that employers explain the essential
requirements of the job and ask all applicants or employees whether they
will be able to meet those requirements. 92 Engaging in this informative
process provides the applicant an opportunity to disclose any conflict he or
she may have with the employer's policies. 93
For example, if an applicant comes to an interview wearing
religious clothing and the interviewer or employer suspects that there may
be a conflict between the applicant's religious practice and the employer's
uniform policy, the employer should tell the applicant about the rule and
ask if it would pose any issues for the applicant. 94 Describing policies to
all applicants and employees allows the employer to investigate a potential
accommodation without violating Title VII's ban on questions directly
related to religious beliefs and practices. 95 However, questions should be

require that he prove that he phrased his disagreement with the mission statement in terms of his
atheism." Id.

91 See Maria Danaher, OMG. Panic Over the Supreme Court's Decision on Religious

EMPLOYMENT
LAW
MATTERS
(June
7,
2015),
http://www.employmentlawmatters.net/20 15/06/articles/ada/omg-panc-over-the-supreme-courtsdecision-on-religiousdiscrimination/?utm source-feedburner&utm medium-feed&utm campaign-Feed%3 A+Emplo
ymentLawMatters+%/o28Employment+Law+Matters%29 (discussing consequence of Courts
ruling in Abercrombie); D'Aquila & Rudolph, supra note 17 ("[T]he employers decision should
be based solely on nondiscriminatory reasons, and the reasons should be legitimate, documented,
and supported in the employer's records"); Mollen & Smith, supra note 50 ("[The] decision
provides employers with a valuable reminder that they should train hiring and management
personnel to ask good questions in the interview process.").
92 See Lee Tankle, Supreme Court: Motive Matters in Hiring Decisions, PENNSYLVANIA
LABOR
&
EMPLOYMENT
BLOG
(June
9,
2015),

Discrimination.,

http://www.palaborandemploymentblog.com/2015/06/articles/discriminationharassment/abercrombie/ (discussing ways employers can comply with finding inAbercrombie).
93 See id.(noting employers do not have to "fish" for possible accommodations).
94 See Dawn Solowey & Ariel Cudowicz, You Can't Stick Your Head in the Sand. Dos and
Dont's for Religious Accommodation in Hiring After EEOC v. Abercrombie, LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT L. COUNSEL (Jun. 16, 2015), http://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com
(providing suggestions for interviewers). "This invites the applicant to disclose any conflict, but
avoids a direct inquiry into the applicant's religion or religious practice." Id.
95 See Wilson, supra note 15 (stating all applicants should be given full notice of essential
job functions and workplace policies); Solowey & Cudowicz, supra note 94 (providing notice of
job functions and workplace policies starts dialogue but avoids stereotyping).
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fact-specific and directly related to job functions
because not all applicants
96
or employees will require an accommodation.
VI. IMPLICATION OF ABERCROMBIE
The decision in Abercrombie creates a lower standard for
individuals claiming religious discrimination and simultaneously increases
the burden on employers to find creative solutions when determining
whether an applicant or employee needs an accommodation. 97 Prior to the
Court's decision, many circuit courts required a person claiming a religious
accommodation violation to prove that his or her employer had confirmed
knowledge of his or her employee's or applicant's religious practice in
order for her to meet her primafacie case. 98 Requiring that the employer
have knowledge of a religious accommodation provided employers with
greater protection because they would be put on notice. 99 Employers did
not need to worry about guessing whether someone might not need an
accommodation nor did they have to worry about asking prohibited
questions. 100
Additionally, the knowledge requirement imposed a
reciprocal duty on the employee.' 0 1 The employee had the duty to inform
his employer of his need for a religious accommodation and the employer

See Eck, supra note 13 (noting breadth of Abercrombie decision is narrowly tailored).
Anyone with hiring authority "[m]aking reasonable inquiries into potential accommodation
matters based on specific facts because it is safe to assume that not all applicants will or even
should be questioned about their religious affiliation when the interaction is free of any facts
96

supporting such an inquiry." Id.; Mark G. Jeffries, Are You Being Nosy or Burying Your Head?
re: Employment Law, NAT'L L. REv. (Feb. 1, 2016), http://sjlaboremploymentblog.com ("If the

inquiry cannot be directly tied to job duties, it's almost certainly better not to ask.").
97 See Eck, supra note 13; Judy Greenwald, Supreme Court's Religious HeadscarfRuling
Bias Risks,
BUSINESS
INSURANCE
(Jun. 7, 2015,
12:00 A.M.),

Increases

http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/00010101/NEWS06/306079977/Supreme-Courtsreligious-headscarf-ruling-increases-employers-bias-risks (stating Abercrombie decision is "going
to really increase the burden on employers ").
98 See Lubetsky v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 1301, 1305 ( 11th Cir. 2002)
(explaining how to make prima facie case). The court explained that "[w]here intentional
religious discrimination under Title VII is alleged, aprimafacie case is established if the plaintiff
demonstrates the challenged employment decision as made by someone who was aware of the
plaintiffs religion." Id. See also Johnson v. Angelica Unif. Grp., Inc., 762 F.2d 671, 672 (8th
Cir. 1985) (affirming no primajaciecase because employee failed to inform employer in advance
of accommodation); Beasley, 940 F.2d at 1088 (holding plaintiff failed to establish credible prima
face case).
99 See Eck, supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussingAbercrombie'sholding).

100See Greenwald, supra note 97 (noting increased difficulty for interviewers).
101See Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing employee's

obligation to inform employer of need for accommodation).
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had the duty to provide that accommodation. 102 Thus, if an applicant or
employee failed to give the employer actual notice of her need for an
accommodation, then the employer would not have a duty to accommodate

her religious practice. 103
Under the Abercrombie motive requirement, an employee is not
10 4
required to tell her employer that she requires an accommodation.
Rather, she need only prove that her need for an accommodation was a
motivating factor in her employer's decision to fire or not hire her. 105
Therefore, a person claiming a religious accommodation violation can meet
her prima facie case even if she only vaguely references a need for an
accommodation or if she wears religious clothing. 0 6 The applicant or
employee need not provide the employer with a greater level of notice. 107
Title VII does not require that the employer have confirmed knowledge of
an employee's need for a religious accommodation in order to be held
liable for religious discrimination. 108 So long as the employer has a
substantiated suspicion and uses this suspicion as a factor in his
employment decision, the employer will be held liable for religious

102

See id. (noting duty to accommodate is reciprocal). Title VII imposes an affirmative duty

on the employers to accommodate and the knowledge requirement imposes an affirmative duty on
the employee to provide notice of his need for religious accommodation. Id.
103 See Drobac & Weasley, supra note 31, and accompanying text (giving reason for
applicant's duty to inform). An employer cannot determine what religious accommodation(s) an
applicant or employee requires without knowing how his or her religious practice conflicts with
current job practices and procedures. See id. Similarly, the EEOC Compliance Manual also
suggests that employees must provide their employer with notice. See EEOC Compliance
Manual, supra note 21 (providing instructions on dealing with religious discrimination). "An
applicant or employee who seeks religious accommodation must make the employer aware both
of the need for accommodation and that it is being requested due to a conflict between religion
and work." Id. (emphasis added).
104 See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015) (stating
applicant need not show employer had actual knowledge of applicant's need for accommodation).
105 See id. (stating applicant need only show need for accommodation was motivating factor
in employer's decision).
106 See Johnsonv. Angelica Unif. Grp., 762 F.2d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing prima
facie requirement of religious discrimination case); Reed, 330 F.3d at 936 ("Even if he wears a
religious symbol, such as a cross or a yarmulka, this may not pinpoint his particular beliefs and
observances; and anyway employers are not charged with detailed knowledge of the beliefs and
observances associated with particular sects.").
107 See Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935-36 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing what
person needs to do to indicate need for religious accommodation).
108 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2033 (disagreeing with
Abercrombie's argument). "[T]he intentional discrimination provision prohibits certain motives,
regardless of the state of the actor's knowledge .... An employer may not make an applicant's
religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions." Id. (emphasis
added). "A request for accommodation, or the employer's certainty that the practice exists, may
make it easier to infer motive, but is not a necessary condition of liability." Id.
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discrimination unless he can show that the accommodation would have
been an undue hardship. 109
The motive requirement, therefore, does away with the employeremployee reciprocal duty that had been established by the previous
knowledge requirement and in some way imposes an additional burden on
employers. 110 The Court's decision confirms that employers must take
steps to accommodate individuals in the workplace if they wish to avoid
potential litigation."' However, implementing procedures that ensure an
employee's religious accommodations do not go unattended is much easier
said than done. 112 After all, an employee does not need to do much in order
to put their employer on notice that they may need a religion
accommodation. 113
What makes the Court's decision complicated is that the EEOC's
Compliance Manual, states that there are no "magic words" required to put
an employer on notice of applicant's or employee's potential need for a
religious accommodation. 114 The employee only needs to provide his
employer with enough information so as to make his employer aware that
his religious practice may be in conflict with his work." 5 For example, an
objection to a policy is sufficient to put an employer on notice that his
employee needs an accommodation. 116 Therefore, the motive requirement
means that employers are left guessing as to whether a person might need
an accommodation. 117
The Court's holding that "an employer may not make an
applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in
109 See id.(interpreting language of Title VII); Tankle, supra note 92 (stating undue hardship
still remains as defense to religious discrimination).
110 See Eck, supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining confusion caused by
Abercrombie decision).
111See Greenwald, supra note 97 (noting increased burden on employers).

See Wilson, supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties of determining
whether person needs accommodation without asking questions that are prohibited).
113 See EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 21 (outlining guidelines for employees and
112

employers).

114 See id. (describing duties of both employer and employee).
"To request an
accommodation, an individual may use plain language and need not mention any particular terms
such as 'Title VII' or 'religious accommodation."' Id.at 47.
115 See Olsen supra note 38 and accompanying text (asserting employers only need

"enough" information).
116 See Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 317, 334 (Pa.
D. 2016) (holding employee's objection to employer's mission statement sufficient to show

employer suspected employee needed accommodation); Mindrup v. Goodman Networks, Inc.,

No. 4:14-CV-157, 2015 U.S. Dist. Lexis 139678, at *27 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2015) (holding
employee's email rejecting employer's bible verse request sufficiently places employer on notice
for accommodation).
117 See Greenwald, supra note 97 (discussing impact of Abercrombie on employers).
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employment decisions""" and the EEOC's unequivocal suggestion that
"[q]uestions about an applicant's affiliations or beliefs.., are generally
viewed as non job-related and problematic under federal law" puts
employers in a difficult position." 9 If an employer suspects that an
applicant or employee may need a religious accommodation and is unable
to confirm his or her suspicion by asking the applicant or employee about
accommodations, the employer can still face liability if he does not0
accommodate because he suspected that an accommodation was needed.12
How do employers fulfill their duty to accommodate if they are prohibited
from inquiring
as to an applicant's or employee's religious affiliation or
2

beliefs?' '
Additionally, the Supreme Court's use of the word "otherwise" is
vague and provides little guidance to employers, leaving many questions
unanswered. 122 The Court seems to suggest that "otherwise" is referring
to
• • ,,123
something that is "no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion.
However, this in of and itself does not provide much guidance to employers
because the Court makes clear that "motive and knowledge are separate
concepts," but acknowledges that the motive requirement itself may not
be
24
met unless the employer suspects that religious practice is in question. 1
Knowledge does not imply motive unless the employer's decision
is based in non-discriminatory reasons. 125 Unsubstantiated suspicion

118 See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2028 (2015) (finding
employer does not need to have knowledge for there to be religious discrimination).
119 See Pre-Employment Inquires and Religious Affiliation or Beliefs, supra note 5

("[E]mployers should avoid questions about an applicant's religious affiliation, such as place of
worship, days of worship, and religious holidays and should not ask for references from religious
leaders, e.g., minister, rabbi, priest, imam, or pastor.").
120 See D'Aquila & Rudolph, supra note 17 ("Although the EEOC discourages an employer
from asking applicants about their religious beliefs and practices ... Abercrombie's manager
asked no religious questions, and yet Abercrombie could face liability if the applicant's religious
practice was a motivating factor in the hiring decision.").
121 See Wilson, supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Court's
decision and tension between Court's holding and EEOC's general guidance); Eck, supra note 13
and accompanying text (noting new hardships causing confusion for employers).
122 See Perlman, supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing questions left unanswered
by Court); D'Aquila & Rudolph, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
123 See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2033 ("[A]n employer who acts with
the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an
unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.").
124 See id. at 2033 n.3 (explaining why lack of motive does not apply in this case). The
Court does not resolve this argument because it was clear that Abercrombie knew or at the very
least suspected that Elauf's headscarf was worn for religious reasons. Id.
125 See id. at 2033 (discussing intentional discrimination provision). "An employer who has
actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation does not violate Title VII by refusing to hire
an applicant if avoiding the accommodation is not his motive." Id.
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implies motive when the employer's decision not to hire is because of that
unsubstantiated suspicion. 126 These two concepts suggest that employers
need to pay closer attention when they have knowledge or suspicion27that a
religious practice may conflict with current policies and procedures. 1
VII. WHAT EMPLOYERS CAN DO TO AVOID LITIGATION
Employers can take certain steps to avoid potential litigation
including, but not limited to, explaining the essential requirements of the
job and asking the applicant or employee whether he or she will be able to
meet those requirements. 1 28 Doing so creates an interactive process
whereby it invites employees to notify the employer of potential conflicts
and also allows the employer to determine whether an applicant or
employee will need an accommodation without directly asking. 129 The
employer, however, should only raise the subject when the employer
suspects that the employee or applicant's practice is religious because
questions about an applicant's religion can itself give rise to a
discrimination claim. i30 Thus, if the employer does not suspect or know
that the applicant or employee has a religious conflict, he should refrain
from asking questions relating to the applicant or employee's religious
practice or belief i3i
Employers should also make sure that the questions they ask are
directly linked to an applicant or employee's job duties. 3 2 The more fact
specific the question, the less likely that the questions will themselves lead

126
127

See id. (assuming employer's intent is what matters).
See Danaher, supra note 91 ("When an issues of religion is raised either directly by an

applicant, or indirectly, through an interviewer's 'suspicion' that a quality or characteristic
contradicts company policy further attention should be paid.").
128

See Tankle, supra note 92 and accompanying text (providing guidance for employers).

129

See Solowey & Cudowicz, supra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining benefit of

disclosing company policies). For example, if an applicant comes to an interview wearing
religious clothing and the interviewer or employer suspects that there may be a conflict between
the applicant's religious practice and the employer's uniform policy, the employer should tell the
applicant about the rule and ask if the rule would pose any issue for the applicant. Id.
130 Wilson supra note 15 ("[E]mployers are likely safer raising that subject only where, as in
Abercrombie, they know or have reason to suspect that the employee's practice is religious.").
131 See Mollen & Smith, supra note 50 (digesting analysis of E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015)). "In some situations, this may require mangers who
suspect the presence of a religious motive for an employee's behavior to act affirmatively to learn
whether their suspicions are correct, and to explore whether and what kind of accommodations
may need to be provided." Id.
132 See Jeffries, supra note 96 ("If the inquiry cannot be directly tied to job duties, it's almost
certainly better not to ask.").
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to religious discrimination claims.' 33 Additionally, employers should be
aware that in most instances they will have a duty to accommodate a
religious practice whether or not an applicant or employee requests an
exemption from the employer's dress or grooming policies because
religious clothing puts the employer on notice that the employee may need
a religious accommodation. 3 4 Employers can also reduce the risk of
religious discrimination claims by documenting the process in its entirety
so that in the event that they do not hire or fire an applicant or employee,
they will be able to show that their employment decision was based solely
on non-discriminatory reasons.135
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's holding in Abercrombie provides fewer
protections to employers. - it lowers the burden for claimants who bring a
religious discrimination case to meet their prima facie case and increase
employers' duty to accommodate.
The knowledge requirement preAbercrombie created a reciprocal duty whereby the employee would have a
duty to inform her employee of her need for an accommodation and the
employer would provide an accommodation. The motive requirement
established by Abercrombie did away with the knowledge requirement and
in doing so eliminated the employee's reciprocal duty to notify her
employer of a need for an accommodation. Therefore, an applicant or
employee does not need to do very much in order to put the employer on
notice. Simply wearing a religious garment can signal to the employer that
the employee needs a religious accommodation.
What makes the Abercrombie decision particularly difficult for
employers is that the EEOC guidelines prohibit employers from asking

133

See Eck, supra note 13 (explaining burden on employers). "Making reasonable inquires

into potential accommodation matters based on specific facts because it is safe to assume that not
all applicant's will or even should be questioned about their religious affiliation when the
interaction is free of any facts supporting such an inquiry." Eck, supra note 13. This is also
supported by the EEOC's suggestion that "[e]mployers can ensure nondiscriminatory treatment
by asking the same questions of all applicants for a particular job or category of job and inquiring
about matters directly related to the position in question." Best Practices for Eradicating
Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/bestpractices religion.html (last modified July
23, 2008), (discussing employer's best practices in context of disparate treatment based on
religion).
134 EEOC v. Jet Stream Ground Servs., 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015) (holding
employer knew or suspected employee needed accommodation because employee wore religious
garb at workplace).
135 See D'Aquila & Rudolph, supra note 17 (discussing what employers should consider
when applying Court's decision).
Employers should base their decisions "solely on
nondiscriminatory reasons, and the reasons should be legitimate, documented, and supported in
the employer's records." Id.
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applicants and employees direct questions about their religious practices.
Therefore, an employer is put in an uncomfortable position. They must try
their best to guess whether a person may need a religious accommodation
while avoiding making judgments based on stereotypes.
Despite this, there are certain things that employers can do in order
to ensure that they provide their applicants and employees with
accommodations. Employers can: (1) ask the same questions to all of its
applicants and employees; (2) provide all applicants and employees with
the job assignment description and ask whether the applicants or employees
will be able to satisfy the requirements; and (3) document the entire process
including reasons for failing to hire or terminating a particular applicant or
employee. Taking these necessary steps helps to mitigate any potential
problems that may arise during the pre-hiring and hiring process.
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